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By Jonathan Fenton-Harvey for Informed Comment
Iranian missiles raining down on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), targeting US military facilities but also hitting civilian areas and infrastructure, set an alarming precedent. The United States and Israel’s assault on Iran has dealt a severe blow to Oman’s efforts in Geneva last month to revive US-Iran talks.
Iran’s actions likely reflect strategic paralysis, trying to deter without escalating. But now, Gulf states are shifting from diplomatic architects to strategic shock absorbers.
Despite the death of long-time leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in joint US-Israeli strikes, Tehran has persisted with missile fire. This underscores the horizontal power structure of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with a successor expected to emerge. Israel has also said it will intensify airstrikes in the coming days.
Throughout the 2020s, Gulf states have fashioned themselves as indispensable enablers of dialogue between adversaries unable to engage directly. Along with Oman’s facilitation of US-Iran backchannels, Qatar played a central role in Israel-Hamas mediation. And since the China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have UAE balanced their dependence on the US security umbrella with careful diplomacy vis-à-vis Tehran.
Since Israel’s 12-day war with Iran in June 2025, Gulf governments have publicly signalled opposition to escalation, highlighting the broader regional risks. This is especially true of Saudi Arabia, whose Vision 2030 reform agenda depends on sustained foreign investment, regional stability and long-term security perceptions. However, Riyadh is not alone in this; economic modernization and essential infrastructure throughout the Gulf depend on reliable security conditions.
Importantly, although the GCC remains concerned about escalation, the crisis has highlighted the extent of the region’s strategic alignment with Washington.
Amid the Israeli-US strikes, The Washington Post – cited multiple US officials asserting that the Saudis, along with Israel, had encouraged Trump to strike Iran – a claim Riyadh firmly denied. Moreover, in January, Axios reported that the Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman warned Trump that hesitation in striking Iran could embolden Tehran.
It would be an overstatement to argue Riyadh decisively influenced Trump’s decision, given the US’ own military build-up prior to the strikes and Trump’s prior escalation rhetoric. However, these reports remain broadly consistent with Riyadh’s dual-track position: public calls for de-escalation while strategically aligning with the US.
Indeed, its rapprochement with Iran was less an embrace than a hedge, given the Saudi government’s main concern is regional security. Notably, while Saudi Arabia condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes, it stopped short of condemning the initial US-Israeli attack, signalling its comfort in aligning strategically with Washington. Riyadh is not alone in this, given the other GCC nations – Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman – have all issued denunciations of Iran’s attacks on Gulf territory.
While Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have sought to avoid being at the forefront of any confrontation with Iran, constraining Tehran’s regional reach aligns with their long-standing security concerns, particularly given attacks from Yemen’s Houthis and Iran-backed Iraqi militias on their territory and oil facilities prior to the 2023 détente.
Although its security concerns have pushed Riyadh towards Washington, its strategic alignment carries risks. A widening conflict that threatens energy infrastructure or maritime trade would erode investor confidence and undermine the transformation narrative Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has projected.
Iran’s strike on three oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of globally traded oil flows, highlights a critical pressure point. Iran may continue to strangle the Strait of Hormuz as leverage against the US.
Qatar and Oman maintain distinctly diplomatic approaches in regional affairs. While Doha’s influence is theoretically substantial due to its hosting of Al Udeid Air Base, Trump’s clear commitment to escalation limits the capacity of such relationships to meaningfully affect policy direction.
Oman faces similar limitations. Its position as a neutral facilitator has traditionally relied on mutual acknowledgment that dialogue benefits all stakeholders. However, if the United States and Iran continue to prioritise force over negotiation, Muscat’s ability to promote meaningful discussions becomes significantly constrained.
As a result, damage control is the only real practical option left.
For the rest of the Gulf, this recalibration reflects a pragmatic hedge, which has long guided its foreign policy calculus. Open opposition to US strategy risks jeopardising core security partnerships, while overt alignment against Iran invites retaliation.
Should hostilities remain limited, Gulf states may look to contain the fallout while quietly advocating renewed negotiations. Given Oman expressed its “dismay” and “regret” at the US-Israeli attacks on Iran, Muscat may work towards encouraging de-escalation, even if that may now prove an arduous task.
Doha, Qatar. ©️ Juan Cole.
But further direct attacks on Gulf territory would likely push the GCC states further into Washington’s orbit. Relations with Iran are currently worsening, given the UAE closed its embassy in Tehran and recalled its ambassador and diplomatic staff.For now, Gulf diplomacy has not vanished. Oman may still seek to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, and Gulf states may quietly encourage Washington to avoid uncontrolled escalation. But the era of ambitious mediation between Washington and Tehran is effectively suspended. GCC leaders are instead tightening intra-Gulf security coordination, including with the United States, as reflected in renewed Saudi-Emirati engagement after last year’s tensions over Yemen, following a call between the two countries’ leaders.
With Trump decisively aligned with Israel, Gulf governments are likely to shape the margins of escalation rather than its direction. And for Saudi Arabia, its fragile rapprochement with Iran is set to slow. But this policy shift shows continuity within the GCC, rather than rupture.
Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a UK-based journalist and researcher, focusing on conflict and international relations in the Middle East and North Africa. Follow him on twitter: @jfentonharvey
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