Vali Kaleji for The Craddle
On the eve of Armenia’s crucial parliamentary elections on 7 June, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, during a brief visit to Yerevan on 26 May, signed three highly significant agreements in a meeting with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan.
These included the “Framework Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the United States of America on Strategic Cooperation Concerning the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP),” the “Charter on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Armenia and the United States,” and the “Republic of Armenia–United States of America Framework For Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths.”
Washington’s election-season endorsement
Rubio’s brief visit, which lasted only about an hour at Yerevan Airport, was a clear signal of US support for Nikol Pashinyan’s government ahead of Armenia’s pivotal parliamentary elections on 7 June.
Over the past several years, Pashinyan’s administration has gradually distanced itself from the Russian Federation and Moscow-led regional institutions, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and, more recently, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), while seeking closer ties with the EU, NATO, and the US.
In this context, the US secretary of state, who traveled to Yerevan two weeks before the elections, expressed strong support for Pashinyan and his team, stating: “You (Ararat Mirzoyan), the prime minister, and your team are paving the way to a brighter, more independent future for Armenia.”
US President Donald Trump also wrote in a post on Truth Social:
“Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, of Armenia, a great friend and Leader, is making his Country strong, wealthy, and very secure! Nikol completely shares my vision of PEACE and PROSPERITY for Armenia and the entire South Caucasus region…. Nikol has my COMPLETE and TOTAL Endorsement for Re-Election on June 7, 2026.”
Armenia also hosted the Eighth Summit of the European Political Community on 23 May, which constituted another indication of western support for Pashinyan’s government.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether such support will ultimately translate into an electoral victory for Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party over its nationalist and conservative opponents. A recent example is Hungary, where the visit of US Vice President J.D. Vance to Budapest and his participation in an election rally alongside Prime Minister Viktor Orban failed to prevent Orban’s defeat in the parliamentary elections after 16 years in power.
The Trump Route takes shape
The three agreements signed during Rubio’s visit to Yerevan – particularly the TRIPP Agreement – should be viewed as a continuation and complement to the peace agreement signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Pashinyan at the White House on 8 August, 2025, under the mediation of Trump.
Under that agreement, direct connectivity between Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic through Armenian territory was endorsed not under Baku’s preferred designation of the “Zangezur Corridor,” nor under Yerevan’s preferred concept of the “Crossroads of Peace,” but rather under a new title: the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), or simply the “Trump Route.”
The TRIPP Agreement, consisting of 11 articles, sets out the legal and operational framework governing this transit route. Pursuant to Articles 1 through 4, a joint venture known as the TRIPP Development Company (TDC) is to be established.
Under the agreement, 74 percent of the shares and controlling interest in the company will be held by US entities operating under the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), while Armenia will retain a 26 percent ownership stake.
Furthermore, under Article 6, Armenia commits to granting the joint venture exclusive land-use and development rights along the designated TRIPP implementation areas for an initial period of 49 years. The agreement also provides for a possible extension of an additional 50 years by mutual consent, in which case Armenia’s ownership stake in the TDC would increase to 49 percent.
Armenia has further undertaken to bear all financial costs associated with land acquisition and the removal of any encumbrances or third-party claims affecting the project areas. At the same time, the agreement explicitly affirms that the Republic of Armenia retains full sovereignty, territorial integrity, and legal and executive jurisdiction over all areas and projects associated with TRIPP within its sovereign territory.
The implementation of this agreement – much like the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and the ongoing process of Armenia–Turkiye normalization – will depend heavily on the re-election of Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party in the 7 June parliamentary elections. Should Armenia’s nationalist and conservative political forces emerge victorious, the political terrain could change significantly.
Strongly critical of Pashinyan’s policies regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, these nationalist and conservative groups maintain hardline positions toward both Azerbaijan and Turkiye. They have traditionally enjoyed closer relations with Iran and Russia while maintaining a cautious and carefully calibrated distance from the west.
Consequently, a change in government could have profound implications for the future of the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, Armenia–Turkiye normalization, and the implementation of TRIPP.
Tehran Sees More Than a Corridor
It was therefore hardly surprising that, amid Armenia’s highly polarized and politically charged atmosphere in the run-up to the crucial parliamentary elections, Rubio’s unexpected and brief visit to Yerevan was met with strong criticism from opposition forces.
Opposition parties and political groups in Armenia argue that the large-scale “Trump Route” project is, in essence, the same transit corridor long sought by Azerbaijan under the name of the “Zangezur Corridor” and strongly supported by Ankara.
Former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan, leader of the influential Armenia Alliance, expressed deep concern over the strategic implications of the agreement, stating:
“I think that the ‘TRIPP’ project is a very strong propaganda move by the US, the aim of which is to create tension between Iran and Armenia, because after that, Tehran will definitely have distrust…This is also a ‘blow’ to Russia.”
In Iran, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hamid Baghaei also reacted to Rubio’s visit and the signing of the Trump Agreement, stating:
“The Islamic Republic of Iran’s position regarding security in the South Caucasus is clear and leaves no room for ambiguity. Iran welcomes the expansion of economic exchanges and the reopening of transportation and transit routes. However, given the United States’ long record of hostile conduct and intervention in various regions of the world, Iran harbors serious suspicions regarding Washington’s intentions and has explicitly expressed its opposition to any such destabilizing presence in the region.”
Although Iranian officials appear to have refrained from adopting a more explicit position at this stage – likely due to their understanding of Armenia’s sensitive electoral environment and a desire to avoid becoming directly involved in the country’s internal political rivalries – Iran, in strategic terms, sees little difference between the “Trump Route” and the “Zangezur Corridor” advocated by Azerbaijan and supported by Turkiye.
From Tehran’s perspective, both initiatives pursue objectives that extend well beyond the establishment of a mere transportation and transit link between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory adjacent to Iran’s border.
Iranian policymakers believe that such projects could generate a number of significant security and geopolitical challenges, including potential risks to the 40-kilometer Iran–Armenia border, the Norduz (Iran) and Meghri (Armenia) border crossings and customs facilities, as well as the bilateral trade and transit network through which more than 80,000 trucks pass annually.
Moreover, there is little doubt that the implementation of the Trump Route, as part of the broader Middle Corridor and an emerging energy and transportation route linking Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus to Europe, would further accelerate Yerevan’s westward orientation.
Such a development could have far-reaching consequences, including Armenia’s eventual withdrawal from the CSTO and the EAEU. The cumulative effect of these developments could be a more profound shift in the geopolitical balance of the South Caucasus to the detriment of both Iran and Russia – a process that, in many respects, began with the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020.
The 12-day US-Israeli war on Iran in June 2025 and the more recent 40-day war involving Israel and the US against Iran, from 28 February to 7 April 2026, have heightened Tehran’s sensitivity toward the Trump Route project and the prospective presence of US companies close to Iran’s northern border.
This concern is particularly pronounced given that, under the recently signed agreement, such a presence is not intended to be temporary. Rather, the arrangement envisages an initial concession period of 49 years, with the possibility of a further 50-year extension by mutual agreement, potentially resulting in a total duration of 99 years.
From Iran’s perspective, this would amount not merely to a transportation or infrastructure project, but to the establishment of a long-term American economic and strategic footprint in a highly sensitive geopolitical area adjacent to its borders.
For this reason, Kocharyan stated during his election campaign:
“Today, the United States is in a state of confrontation with Iran. Under such circumstances, how can anyone reasonably believe that handing control over the sensitive Armenia–Iran border area to an American company is a rational decision? Do you truly consider such a step normal and acceptable? How is Tehran expected to perceive and tolerate such an arrangement? I urge the authorities in Yerevan to place themselves, even for a moment, in Iran’s position and to view this security challenge from Tehran’s perspective.”
Moscow raises the cost
Russia’s response toward Armenia, however, has been noticeably sharper – at least at the present stage. Only a few days after Rubio’s visit, Moscow recalled its ambassador from Yerevan for consultations, citing the increasingly pro-western policies of the Pashinyan government.
In recent weeks, Russian officials have openly warned Armenia, particularly in connection with the possibility of its withdrawal from the EAEU, about potential consequences, including higher gas prices or the suspension of preferential energy arrangements, restrictions on imports of Armenian goods, limitations on the diamond and energy trade, and even a reassessment of certain areas of economic cooperation.
In essence, Moscow is concerned that its ongoing involvement in the war in Ukraine may encourage Armenia – the only South Caucasus state that remains a member of both the EAEU and the CSTO – to leave these Russian-led institutions.
Given that neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan is a member of either organization, such a development would significantly diminish Russia’s economic, geopolitical, and military influence in the South Caucasus.
The implementation of the TRIPP Agreement and the construction of the Trump Route between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan face substantial political obstacles and will depend heavily on the outcome of Armenia’s 7 June parliamentary elections.
Should Armenia’s nationalist and conservative political forces prevail, the likelihood of the project being suspended or abandoned would be considerable.
Even if Pashinyan secures re-election, the implementation of the project is likely to provoke strong opposition from Iran and expose Armenia to potential retaliatory measures from Russia, particularly in the areas of natural gas exports and restrictions on Armenian imports.
Vali Kaleji is based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asia and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues and Iran’ foreign policy for Oxford Analytica in the UK, Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation, Institute of Central Asia and the Caucasus (American Foreign Policy Council), the National Interest and the Middle East Institute in the United States, TRENDS Research & Advisory in the UAE, Middle East Council on Global Affairs in Doha, Qatar, and also Nikkei Asia.
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