Joshua Scheer
As Washington celebrates America’s 250th anniversary, former CIA analyst Larry Johnson argues that the real story is unfolding thousands of miles away in the Persian Gulf. In this wide-ranging conversation with Glenn Diesen, Johnson contends that the Trump administration’s memorandum of understanding with Iran was driven less by diplomacy than by mounting energy pressures and the threat of a worsening fuel crisis. He further argues that Washington is already attempting to reinterpret key provisions of the agreement while quietly reducing its military footprint in the region.
Johnson also examines the strategic consequences of the conflict, the future of the Strait of Hormuz, the balance of power between the United States, Iran, and Israel, and the growing risk of confrontation between NATO and Russia. Whether one agrees with his conclusions or not, the discussion offers a provocative perspective on rapidly shifting geopolitical realities at a moment when global stability remains deeply uncertain.
A Deal Born of Necessity?
Johnson points to President Trump’s own public remarks that the United States had only “four weeks” of critical fuel supplies remaining as evidence that Washington faced mounting pressure.
With Trump saying “If we keep bombing, those ships won’t be going… We run out of reserves in about four weeks.”
According to Johnson, the issue was never a general shortage of crude oil. Instead, he argues the problem centered on heavy, high-sulfur crude, the type of oil many American refineries depend upon to produce diesel fuel and aviation fuel.
“The shortage,” Johnson explained, “is not oil in general. The shortage in particular is the heavy crude that’s used to make diesel and aviation fuel.”
That distinction, he argues, fundamentally changes how the conflict should be understood.
When hostilities disrupted shipping through the Persian Gulf, Johnson says the immediate impact was masked because dozens of oil tankers already at sea continued delivering cargoes that had departed before the fighting intensified. Once those shipments arrived weeks later, however, the underlying supply problem began to emerge.
In Johnson’s view, it was no coincidence that Washington pushed aggressively for a ceasefire around the same time those reserves were nearing exhaustion.
Why Heavy Crude Matters
Much of Johnson’s analysis focuses on a technical issue that rarely enters public debate: not all crude oil is interchangeable.
Many U.S. refineries were specifically designed decades ago to process heavier, sulfur-rich crude imported from the Persian Gulf and other regions. Lighter “sweet” crude, including much of the oil produced domestically, requires different refining processes and cannot simply replace those imports overnight.
Johnson compared the situation to brewing coffee.
Using a Keurig machine and preparing coffee with a French press both produce coffee, he noted, but the process is entirely different. Oil refining, he argued, works much the same way.
Heavy crude produces the “middle distillates” used for diesel and aviation fuel—two products essential not only for civilian transportation but also for military logistics.
If those supplies tighten, Johnson warns, policymakers could eventually face difficult choices between supporting commercial transportation, agriculture, and military operations.
Of course, this also helps explain why Trump has long been interested in Venezuela’s oil. Not all oil is the same. The United States now produces mostly light shale crude, which flows easily, contains less sulfur, and is relatively inexpensive to refine into gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. But many U.S. refineries—particularly along the Gulf Coast—were built decades ago to process heavy crude.
Venezuela holds the world’s largest reserves of extra-heavy crude oil. While it is thicker, contains more sulfur, and is more expensive to extract and refine, it is precisely the type of crude many American refineries were designed to handle. In short, the issue isn’t simply how much oil the United States produces—it’s whether it has access to the right kind of oil. That makes Venezuela’s heavy crude a strategically valuable resource for U.S. energy and refining interests.
Drawing Down America’s Strategic Reserve
Johnson also points to the drawdown of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as evidence that officials recognized the seriousness of the situation.
According to his analysis, releasing emergency reserves delayed the impact of supply disruptions but did not solve the underlying problem.
Even if oil exports from the Persian Gulf resumed immediately, he argues, tankers would still require weeks to reach American ports.
“The markets,” Johnson said, “haven’t caught up to this yet.”
In his view, the consequences may become visible only after reserve supplies diminish further, leaving policymakers with fewer options if another military crisis or natural disaster interrupts refining capacity.
With America’s Emergency Oil Reserve Falling to Its Lowest Level in 43 years, with just 326 million barrels remaining after thirteen consecutive weeks of drawdowns. For many observers, it appears the United States has dangerously weakened one of its most important emergency safeguards.
But the picture is more complicated
Much of the recent release was part of an internationally coordinated response to the disruption caused by the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran and the temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
This was not considered a permanent selloff.
Instead, the oil was distributed through a loan program that requires recipients to return the crude—plus an additional 18% to 24% premium—once markets stabilize. If that happens and the program functions as intended, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve could ultimately end up larger than it is today.
Of course, this is what Johnson and Trump are talking about when they say a deal is needed immediately before the situation worsens.
Because even conservative estimates cannot completely assuage the very real and legitimate concerns.
The emergency reserves still remain historically low, and gasoline inventories are tight in several regions.
With the current instability in place, any new geopolitical crisis, hurricane, or refinery disruption could quickly test America’s energy resilience.
And what we have seen from this illegal, immoral war is that the conflict with Iran exposed just how dependent the global economy remains on the uninterrupted flow of oil through the Persian Gulf.
Is Washington Already Rewriting the Agreement?
Johnson believes the memorandum itself is already becoming a source of conflict.
He argues that shortly after signing the agreement, Washington began pressing Iran for additional concessions beyond the document’s original language.
One dispute concerns transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
Johnson contends that the memorandum granted Iran primary responsibility for managing commercial shipping during an initial sixty-day period and did not explicitly prohibit Tehran from later charging transit fees.
“The language is what the language is,” Johnson argued.
He also points to provisions concerning Lebanese sovereignty, claiming Washington has already taken actions inconsistent with commitments contained in the agreement.
Whether those legal interpretations withstand broader scrutiny remains open to debate. Nevertheless, Johnson believes the disagreements illustrate a familiar pattern in U.S. foreign policy—signing an agreement and then seeking to renegotiate key provisions afterward.
A Quiet Military Drawdown
Perhaps Johnson’s most striking argument concerns the American military posture in the region.
Contrary to public perceptions of continuing escalation, he contends the United States has begun quietly reducing its operational footprint.
Johnson cites reports of force withdrawals, changes in command operations, and the reduced activity of military crisis response teams that previously operated around the clock.
He also argues several important regional facilities have suffered damage or have become significantly less capable than before the conflict.
Taken together, Johnson sees these developments as evidence that Washington is attempting to lower the risk of another direct confrontation with Iran—even while maintaining more aggressive public rhetoric.
“The United States continues to talk tough,” he said, “but across the board they’re withdrawing.”
According to Firstpost’s Vantage, the fallout from the Iran war may be reshaping one of Washington’s most important strategic relationships. The program reports that tensions between President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have deepened after Riyadh refused to allow U.S. forces to use Saudi air bases for offensive strikes against Iran. Citing reports of a Pentagon “global posture review,” the segment says the United States is now considering withdrawing its roughly 2,300 troops from the kingdom, along with Patriot air defense systems and fighter aircraft. Vantage argues that the dispute reflects more than a personal clash between Trump and the Saudi crown prince. During the conflict, Saudi Arabia reportedly suffered major economic losses as civilian airports closed, foreign investment slowed, and oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz were disrupted. The program contends that Riyadh chose to limit U.S. access to its bases to avoid deeper involvement in the war, a decision it says has strained decades of American security guarantees. It also points to Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s decision to visit other Gulf states while skipping Saudi Arabia as another sign of cooling relations, warning that if the reported troop withdrawal proceeds, it could have broader implications for the U.S. military presence across the Gulf.
Nor is it just the United States. One also has to wonder what becomes of the relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Despite decades of public hostility and the absence of formal diplomatic ties, reports suggest Israeli military technology has quietly become embedded in the defense systems of several Gulf states through U.S. defense contracts. That hidden security cooperation underscores how strategic interests in the Middle East have long been far more intertwined than official political rhetoric has acknowledged. If the current regional realignment continues, even these quiet partnerships may face unprecedented strain.
This is not old news. It was reported on July 3, underscoring once again how the U.S.-Israeli war of aggression against Iran has accelerated the erosion of American influence in the Middle East. Whatever goodwill Washington once enjoyed in the region continues to evaporate as longtime partners increasingly distance themselves from U.S. policy. Of course, with friends like the Saudi monarchy and Israel, it’s fair to ask who needs enemies.
Has Iran Gained the Strategic Advantage?
Johnson believes the war ultimately strengthened rather than weakened Iran’s regional position.
He argues Tehran now exercises greater leverage over the Strait of Hormuz while maintaining significant influence over global energy markets.
He further contends that Israel’s ability to conduct sustained military operations against Iran has been significantly reduced.
According to Johnson, Israel could still launch limited strikes but would struggle to sustain a prolonged campaign without substantial American logistical support.
He also argues that Iranian ballistic missile capabilities exposed important weaknesses in Israeli air defenses during the conflict.
Those assessments differ sharply from many official Western accounts of the war, but they form the foundation of Johnson’s broader conclusion that the regional balance of power has shifted.
In a analysis originally published by The Cipher Brief Harrison Kass argues that the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran marked the first major conflict in decades in which American air superiority could no longer be taken for granted. Rather than simply overwhelming an adversary from the outset, U.S. forces had to wage a complex, multi-domain campaign to dismantle Iran’s layered air defenses—a warning that future conflicts against more capable powers could prove far more difficult and costly.
Writing that American military planners operated under the assumption that control of the skies was virtually automatic. From Panama to Iraq and Afghanistan, overwhelming U.S. air superiority was treated as a given rather than an objective that had to be earned. But the war with Iran challenged that long-standing doctrine. Although U.S. and Israeli forces ultimately established air superiority in just a few days, doing so required an unprecedented combination of cyber operations, electronic warfare, stealth bombers, intelligence sharing, cruise missiles, and coordinated strikes against more than a thousand targets. The lesson extends far beyond Iran itself. If overwhelming force was required to dismantle a regional power’s layered defenses, military strategists are now confronting a far more sobering question: what would a conflict against a near-peer adversary such as China or Russia demand?
As one national security analyst argues, the era in which American air dominance could simply be assumed may be coming to an end.
The Next Flashpoint May Be Europe
The interview concludes by turning to Europe, where Johnson expresses concern that tensions between NATO and Russia continue to intensify.
He dismisses reports suggesting Russia would launch a symbolic strike merely to test NATO’s resolve.
Instead, Johnson argues Moscow increasingly views European governments as direct participants in the conflict through military assistance, intelligence cooperation, and weapons production.
He points to deteriorating relations between Poland and Ukraine, renewed historical disputes over wartime atrocities, and increasingly confrontational rhetoric from several European governments as signs that political conditions continue to worsen.
Johnson warns that if long-range attacks on Russian territory continue, Moscow may eventually decide to strike military infrastructure beyond Ukraine’s borders.
This from a few hours ago with Moscow arguing that Europe’s accelerating military buildup is no longer simply about supporting Ukraine but reflects broader preparations for a potential confrontation with Russia. Russian officials point to the European Union’s growing investment in ammunition production, armored vehicles, air defense systems, and efforts to reduce dependence on U.S. weapons, alongside NATO’s commitment to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. Under pressure from President Donald Trump, many NATO members—including Germany, Spain, and Norway—have significantly increased their military budgets. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has argued that NATO’s long-stated goal of inflicting a “strategic defeat” on Russia has effectively become an open conflict, describing Ukraine as a “geopolitical battering ram.” Moscow also cites Finland’s decision to lift its decades-old ban on hosting nuclear weapons and Lithuania’s consideration of a similar move as evidence that countries along Russia’s borders are expanding their military posture. The Kremlin maintains that the continued movement of NATO forces and weapons closer to Russian territory constitutes a direct security threat that will be met with additional Russian troop deployments and military reinforcements.
Here is Putin speaking on this matter
Whether Larry Johnson’s analysis ultimately proves correct remains to be seen, though the evidence presented here appears to support many of his central arguments. As events continue to unfold, a growing body of reporting and observable developments lends increasing credibility to his assessment.
This war with Iran has exposed vulnerabilities that many policymakers arrogantly dismissed or assumed simply did not exist: America’s dependence on global energy flows, the enormous cost of establishing air superiority against even a regional power, and the growing willingness of longtime allies to pursue their own interests rather than simply follow Washington’s lead. At the same time, Russia and China are watching closely, studying not only America’s military strengths but also its strategic limitations and political miscalculations.
If there is one lesson emerging from the conflict, it is that the era of uncontested American dominance is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Military power alone cannot secure global supply chains, guarantee political loyalty, or erase the consequences of strategic miscalculation. Whether in the Persian Gulf, Europe, or the Indo-Pacific, the assumptions that shaped U.S. foreign policy for more than three decades are being tested in real time.
As America marks 250 years of independence, perhaps the greatest danger is not that Washington lacks military power, but that it continues to mistake military supremacy for strategic success. History repeatedly shows that wars are often judged not by who wins the first battles, but by the political realities they leave behind. If this conflict has revealed anything, it is that a more fragmented, multipolar world is already here—and no amount of military force can reverse that reality.
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