
By Susan Kang & Felipe Ramos Garcia
This article was originally published by Truthout
In Brazil’s election, Lula didn’t organize the youth. The youth organized Lula.
There has been much ink spilled since October about the role of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s informal social media supporters, called “Lula’s Army,” in mobilizing for his victory in the second round of presidential votes. Following the first-round victory of Lula’s right-wing rival, Flavio Bolsonaro, on October 4, 2026, some political commentators declared Lula a lame duck, comparing him to President Joe Biden. But Lula defied expectations, pulling off a stunning and historic second-round victory, in a higher-turnout second-round vote that consolidated support for the now fourth-term incumbent.
Multiple media sources have credited Lula’s comeback to André Janones, the “general” of Lula’s Army, the WhatsApp community of more than 10 million that successfully used social media to share and boost support for the left-wing leader. Some commentators have considered how the digital army model could be replicated (with efforts beginning in Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, and EU countries) in upcoming elections. But less attention in English-language media has been paid to the role of regular grassroots organizers in Brazil, many of whom were engaging in politics for the first time, and how they might continue to engage in their newly activated mobilization infrastructure.
A Spontaneous Grassroots Upswell
Young Brazilian grassroots organizers, many of them first-time political activists not affiliated with any political party, were more than just loyal soldiers in the WhatsApp-driven campaign for Lula. They did not wait for official directives but instead began mass mobilizations on October 5 in Rio and other cities. Organizers began to mobilize support in their networks: students, K-pop and pop music fandoms, artists, and a generation of young leftists took to the streets and to group chats. When Lula marched down São Paulo’s Avenida Paulista on October 11, 2026, with an estimated 1 million supporters, he benefited from the self-organization of his newly activated support base. This event, called the March for Democracy, was organized by student groups, LGBTQ groups, and fan networks. The event was compared to the 1983 Diretas Já — the mass mobilization that demanded an end to the military dictatorship.
Notably, the grassroots mobilizing moved away from the official campaign’s core legacy message. Rather than provide voters a clear sense of what a fourth term Lula presidency might bring, Lula’s official campaign during the first round relied heavily on his laurels and the accomplishments of his three previous terms, such as the successful Bolsa Família, a direct cash transfer program that lifted millions of families out of poverty. During the election’s first round, Lula did not have a strong social media presence aside from some highly produced official videos, and famously did not have a cell phone. The official campaign did not promote social media posts or many mass public events, and Lula at times drew criticism for talking too much about artificial intelligence and defending Brazil’s rare minerals from Trump’s colonial designs, rather than centering people’s everyday concerns. Furthermore, any criticisms of the official campaign were reportedly not well received.
Youth Organizers Take the Lead
Recognizing the threat to democracy, independent youth organizers mobilized support for Lula in all kinds of places: at kitchen tables, on family group chats, and on neighbors’ doorsteps. Maria Clara de Oliveira, a 25-year-old photographer in São Paulo, told Truthout, “I flipped a lot of votes, mostly women’s.”
Her biggest success was changing the minds of her girlfriend’s aunts: older evangelical women with conservative views who had skipped the first round altogether. “Talking to those aunts made a big difference,” she said. With voters like them, “what worked was being frank, talking, and understanding that person’s reality.” She borrowed a line that circulated widely among organizers in those weeks: “Fight with all your strength, but never lose your tenderness.”
Others worked their own networks, one contact at a time. Lorrana Freitas, 27, had never organized anything before. She waited three days to get into Janones’s channel, then followed its instructions: hashtags to push up on X, far right content to ignore. She also brought her downstairs neighbor to a protest.
“She wouldn’t have gone if I hadn’t invited her, because she had no one to go with,” Freitas told Truthout. The strategy, as she saw it, “wasn’t necessarily each person flipping a vote, but each person who joined bringing one more person.”
Nicole Montilla, 18, got her voter ID this year and spent the campaign handing out stickers. To friends who had stayed home or spoiled their ballots, she explained to Truthout that “the best way to end the Bolsonaro-versus-Lula polarization was to vote 13 [Lula’s ballot line].”
Lucas Souza, 20, a student in São Paulo, handed out flyers and worked on his cousins. His father had voted for right-wing governor Ronaldo Caiado in the first round and planned to back Bolsonaro in the second round. Souza explained to Truthout “I talked his ear off so much that he said they were all bad and didn’t vote at all,” Souza said. “I don’t know if that counts as flipping a vote, but I think I took a vote away from Flávio.”
The organizing did not just add bodies to the streets. It changed the campaign. When Janones — who remained a strong ally to Lula despite no longer being an active member of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), of which Lula is a member — launched Lula’s Army on October 5, he did it, according to Metrópoles, without asking the campaign’s permission.
A friend of Souza’s turned his large K-pop fan page into a political operation, and Souza told us that the K-pop fanbase “practically became a member of the campaign.”
“That’s when I realized this wasn’t coming from Lula’s campaign,” Souza said. “It was something more, I don’t know, spontaneous. The campaign itself didn’t really get it and didn’t really know what to do.”
He told Truthout he had no contact with anyone from the PT “until the bigger protests started happening.” Two days after the first round, young PT lawmakers publicly demanded that Lula stop selling his biography and start offering a future.
Within weeks, the campaign was borrowing the movement’s playbook. Lula and his vice president, Geraldo Alckmin, began posting selfie-style videos. When a court shut Janones’s channel down on October 11, the electoral court changed its rules and the channel came back. For Freitas, the new tone made politics feel within reach. “Even for me, and I was already on the left, I feel much closer, more active and more included in political life than I did before,” Freitas told Truthout.
Montilla’s advice to the government is blunt: “Keep using social media, because that’s where young people are, not broadcast TV or newspapers.” But Souza is clear about who moved first. He explained to Truthout: “We were the ones who mobilized, we were the ones who took to the streets,” he said. “If we had waited for the government, I don’t know what would have happened.”
Brazil’s Younger Voters Are Just Getting Started
Going forward, Lula will face challenges from local government and both houses of the national legislature. Unlike in the U.S., where the midterms’ blue wave loosened the right’s hold on Congress, in Brazil, Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party won a plurality of seats.
Faced with this situation, the popular mobilization that propelled Lula’s reelection will need to continue to directly pressure Brazilian legislators to work with Lula to solve the issues that matter most to Brazilians: cost of living, inflation, jobs, inequality, corruption, public services, safety, and more.
Thankfully it appears that young people in Brazil are not done mobilizing in the aftermath of Lula’s historic victory.
Souza told Truthout that his chats have remained active and focused on politics, and the election of charismatic younger politicians has helped to keep younger voters engaged. He said:
Several of my friends said that: they felt their contribution helped, whether posting, talking to friends and family, or going to the streets. I think that’s usually missing. Politics feels very distant. But I felt closer to politicians I liked and already followed, even without knowing much about them. I think if we stay connected and feel part of it, that’s a good thing.
Freitas urged the PT and Lula government to continue engaging with young people as a necessary condition for Brazil’s democracy, telling Truthout: “If no one talks to young people, if we don’t talk to young people, if the left doesn’t take a stand with young people, someone else will, right? There are several books that say a vacuum is very fertile ground for fascism to take over. Fascism really does come in those moments of vacuum, maybe a lapse in power. It finds the fertilizer it needs to grow and put down roots.”
Montilla also credits the popularity of Guilherme Cortez — a progressive state deputy elected to national congress this year for the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL) — for the continuation of youth and mass engagement, both in person and on social media. She believes that “continuing to talk about politics every day, keeping everyone informed about what’s happening in the world, in the presidential palace and in Congress” will help ensure that “people will also vote more consciously in the coming years.”
What Lessons Does This Hold for the US?
How can defenders of democracy and participants in the U.S. fight against right-wing encroachment take lessons from the success of Brazil’s grassroots victory?
The experiences of members of Lula’s Army are reminiscent of the mass youth mobilizations that fueled the successful election of New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani, whose candidacy was once a long shot. Mamdani may have had underdog status, but his successful two rounds of the mayoral race relied on a strategy that grassroots communications practitioners call “surround sound organizing” in which potential voters/supporters see and hear messaging in all parts of their lives: receiving fliers and mailers, reading the news, seeing messaging on their social media networks, having in-person interactions with volunteer canvassers, and hearing about Mamdani informally through friends, family members, coworkers, and other community members.
Americans, especially those energized from the midterm elections, would do well to take a page from the mobilization of Brazilian leftists and remain committed to engaging in democracy as a long-term and regular activity, not just a responsibility around periodic elections. As Oliveira told Truthout “we always have to remind people, as real political education, that politics happens every day … To turn [the divisions in Brazilian society] into a collective struggle, you have to remind people that the political struggle is much bigger. Getting where we need to go takes a very long time.”
Democracy works best with the consistent mobilization and engagement of the people, and does not stop following electoral successes.
No matter who wins the contested House and Senate leadership fights, people in the U.S. should organize, mobilize, and demand more from the elected leadership and each other, to make our democracy work better for everyone.
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We combined the two photos of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, including one with Brazilian congressman André Janones, with images of rallies and young supporters. The collage illustrates the focus of the Truthout article: how young Brazilians organized and mobilized to help make Lula’s reelection possible.
We’re using this photo of Brazilian congressman André Janones embracing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on election night because it captures the moment Lula publicly thanked a key campaign ally. The Economist profiles Janones and examines how his WhatsApp campaign mobilized supporters ahead of Brazil’s presidential runoff. Folha Read the story at The Economist
2. Lula in front of the Brazilian flag (first photo attached)
We’re using this portrait of Lula to illustrate the broader story of Brazil’s presidential election. Reuters reports how Lula came from behind in the first round to defeat Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro in the runoff and win a fourth term. reuters.com Read the election story at Reuters
