Shahram Akbarzadeh Informed Comment
On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed a pact in Mecca. The joint statement declared an attack on one as an attack on all. Many labelled this as an Islamic NATO, built to deter Iran. But that framing misses the point. The pact says more about the growing concern with the US ability or commitment to securing the region than any threats posed by Iran.
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had already signed a defence agreement in September 2025, signalling Riyadh’s growing recognition that exclusive reliance on the United States might no longer suit a rapidly changing regional environment. Türkiye’s accession has transformed that bilateral arrangement into a regional pact. Confidence in the United States as the region’s security guarantor has been shaken.
Riyadh, characteristically, has downplayed the shift in strategic thinking. A Saudi official told Reuters the earlier bilateral pact with Pakistan was not a response to specific countries or events, but the institutionalisation of decades of cooperation. That framing has carried over to the trilateral pact: nothing new, just formalising what already exists.
The Mecca Pact was signed against the backdrop of a war that has affected the region and risks dragging it deeper into conflict. The US and Israel attacked Iran on February 28. Iran and its allies responded by hitting neighbouring states that host US military assets. For months, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has been disrupted, affecting Persian Gulf economies that depend on that waterway for import of goods and oil and gas exports. Tehran’s decision to weaponize the Strait was aimed at raising the economic cost of war for the United States and its allies.
Yet, Saudi Arabia has been exploring its security options before the 2026 war. In September 2025, Israel targeted a Hamas delegation in a residential compound in Doha. This was the first time Israel hit a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The target was a group of Hamas negotiators reviewing a US-backed ceasefire proposal for Gaza. The strike raised serious questions about the threat that Israel could pose to the region. Israel’s presumed nuclear capability, together with US diplomatic protection of Tel Aviv against international sanctions for its war crimes in Gaza have combined to give the Saudis pause.
For its part, Iran seized the opportunity to promote its own narrative and framed the Mecca Pact as a vindication of its policies. Foreign ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said regional states have come to see Israel as the greatest threat to the region and no longer trust Washington’s assurances of protection. This narrative drew on Iran’s view of the US presence in the Persian Gulf region as a source of instability. Iran has repeatedly called for the withdrawal of US troops and the closure of US bases in the region. The Mecca Pact was interpreted as a recognition of Iran’s position. This may reflect Iran’s wishful thinking as nothing in public statements regarding the Pact suggests a break with the United States.
At the same time, Türkiye and Pakistan have done nothing to conceal their attitude towards Israel. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has described Israel as a burden on humanity. A day after the Mecca signing, Pakistan’s defence minister called for a united military front against Israel, naming it a threat to the entire Muslim world. Israeli officials also read the pact the same way. A senior Israeli official called it an alliance aimed against Israel, and voiced concern that Egypt could be next to join.
There is little evidence to suggest the signatories expect much from the Pact. Two days after the signing, a Houthi drone struck an Aramco refinery in Saudi Arabia. It did not trigger a collective response, leading some observers to call the Pact toothless. It is fair to say that the Pact remains more a declaration of intent than a functioning defence treaty, since it provides no public detail on command arrangements, force commitments or the circumstances that would trigger collective action. It is perhaps in response to this scepticism that Türkiye outlined a pathway towards institutionalisation, including military coordination mechanisms, joint exercises, defence-industrial collaboration. Their translation into durable institutions and practical cooperation will determine if the Pact evolves beyond political signalling into a credible security architecture.
Nevertheless, the Pact suggests serious strategic rethinking in the region that hinges on the reliability of the United States as the region’s guarantor of peace and stability. Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad are diversifying their security bets after watching Iranian strikes on countries hosting US bases. But no signatory has walked back its ties to Washington. Turkish officials insist the pact replaces nothing already in place, and Riyadh continues to pursue civil nuclear cooperation with the US and major arms purchases in parallel. It is far too early to write Washington out of the picture.
Photo by Haythem Gataa on Unsplash
Important to note here that the Pact offers a framework for regional defence cooperation. Qatar‘s former prime minister floated GCC-wide accession, and Egypt’s name keeps coming up as a possible next member. Chatham House’s Sanam Vakil frames it as answering three factors at once: US unreliability, Israeli assertiveness and Iranian retaliation. These are interlinked factors, and have played out openly since the October 2023 Gaza War which saw Israel punish Iran-allied armed groups with US protection, and eventually take the war to Iran in June 2025, prompting Iranian retaliatory strikes on US assets across the region.
The Pact sits alongside existing frameworks. Türkiye remains a NATO member, and nothing in the Mecca text touches its Article 5 obligations. Saudi Arabia’s own defence relationship with Washington continues, including plans for the purchase of F-35 jets and a civil nuclear deal. The GCC’s joint defence mechanism, activated after the Doha strike, still stands on a separate track. Egypt already coordinates with all three signatories, so its possible accession would thicken existing relationships. None of this amounts to a rival security architecture. Rather, the pact is best understood as an additional layered atop existing arrangements that the three states are not prepared to abandon.
Doubts about Washington, fear of Israel, and pressure from Iran’s war have pushed Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad towards a hedging strategy. Whether it can do more than hedge is an open question. The Mecca Pact gives plenty for Washington to consider about regional confidence in its standing and reveals that US partners in the region feel they can no longer rely on Washington exclusively for their security.
Editor’s Note: At a moment when the once vaunted model of responsible journalism is overwhelmingly the play thing of self-serving billionaires and their corporate scribes, alternatives of integrity are desperately needed, and ScheerPost is one of them. Please support our independent journalism by contributing to our online donation platform, Network for Good, or send a check to our new PO Box. We can’t thank you enough, and promise to keep bringing you this kind of vital news.
You can also make a donation to our PayPal or subscribe to our Patreon.