Trita Parsi Substack
The conditions that enabled the first Trump-Iran deal have changed. The new conditions suggest no durable US-Iran deal until Trump’s term ends.
n March 9 of this year, roughly ten days into the Iran war, I made the following points on Twitter:
Trump is desperately seeking to end the war, but Iran has a vote to, and it won’t allow the war to end quite yet for a few reasons:
“Tehran objects to what it would consider a premature ceasefire out of fear that it would only give the US and Israel time to regroup, rearm, and then re-attack Iran. For the conflict to be ripe for a ceasefire, Tehran believes that enough cost must have been inflicted on the US, regional states, Israel, and on the global economy that all states conclude that starting the war was a mistake – and as a result, no state will seek to restart it.
Moreover, if the war ends now, Iran will be in a worse situation than it was before the start of the war. Much of its infrastructure has been destroyed, its missile capabilities have taken hits, its ability to export oil has been damaged, and most crucially, its prospects for sanctions relief have been obliterated. Indeed, who will and can help rebuild Iran under these circumstances?
This would leave Iran not only in a weakened position but also in a continuously weakening state. Which, in turn, would make another war of aggression by the US and Israel more, not less, likely, since it is Iran’s perceived weakness that prompted Trump and Israel to see an opportunity for war.
As such, it appears likely that Iran will continue to target Israel, even if the US declares victory and withdraws its military. Even GCC states may continue to be targeted. And Tehran will very likely try to keep the Straits of Hormuz shut.
Iran, of course, does not want, nor can it afford, an endless war. But it will likely demand some significant steps in order to accept a ceasefire. This may include a commitment from Trump not to restart the war (though I don’t understand the value of such a commitment). But more importantly, it will likely require sanctions relief and release of its frozen funds abroad.”
In retrospect, the assessment appears to have held up quite well. My expectations of what a deal would entail closely follow the key points of the MOU three months later – the Iranians dragged out diplomacy to increase the cost for the US, kept the Strait closed until a deal was reached, demanded a commitment from Trump not to restart the war, as well as significant sanctions relief (Trump lifted oil sanctions on Iran) and the release of frozen assets.
The question now is: In light of reports that Trump is eyeing a strike on Pickaxe Mountain using the Mother of All Bombs, how has the situation evolved, and would a new deal look very different?
Consider the following developments:
Trump’s Perceived Desire for a Deal
In February and June, the Iranians still believed a deal with Trump was possible. They saw Trump as a president who yearned to be historic – either by striking a deal with Tehran or by becoming the president who got rid of the Islamic Republic. If the latter proved impossible, Trump was still attracted to the idea of a deal.
Tehran no longer holds this view. Instead, Trump is seen as an inherently unstable and immature person who may want a deal, but does not have the discipline to secure one or the strength to keep it in the face of attacks from Israel and pro-Israeli forces in the US.
Moreover, Tehran no longer believes even a face-saving exit for Trump would work and, as a result, is far less inclined to offer him one than it was in June. In their view, he has already committed acts that could allow him to declare such a “win,” including striking Fordo or assassinating Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. As such, he doesn’t need to strike Pickaxe Mountain to build a legacy. Instead, Tehran sees such a strike as a stepping stone toward a larger regime-change or collapse operation.
Trump Hasn’t Hurt Enough
Views on how and why the MOU collapsed vary widely. The US blames Tehran’s attacks on ships in the Strait of Hormuz; Iran believes the US started undermining the MOU almost immediately after signing it by seeking to establish a southern corridor in the waterway and by backtracking on commitments in Lebanon.
As a result, the Iranian narrative suggests that Trump did not hurt enough before agreeing to the MOU. Had the war been more costly, he would have had stronger incentives to keep the agreement.
Combined with the idea that he cannot keep a deal, this results in an Iranian perception that the war can only end once the cost of continuing it becomes intolerable for Trump.
That is, incentives or face-saving exits won’t end the war; Trump reaching a military dead-end will.
Pickaxe Won’t End the War
These perceptions profoundly shape the implications of Trump striking Pickaxe Mountain with a MOAB, a step Trump reportedly is contemplating as a way to declare victory and end the war.
Rather than a “deescalatory escalation,” Tehran’s likely reaction will be a major expansion of the war. Tehran does not believe Trump will use such an attack to provide himself with a face-saving exit, but rather as a step toward greater escalation. Iran’s experience with Trump is that he backs off only if Tehran inflicts high costs on his strategy.
A proportional Iranian response to an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be to strike at other nuclear facilities in the region, including in the UAE and Israel. While this would significantly destabilize the region, Tehran believes only such a response would prompt Trump to back off.
Tehran Continues to Insist on a Regional Ceasefire
Per Iran’s insistence, the MOU’s first paragraph established a regional ceasefire, not just one between the US and Iran. Most importantly, that regional ceasefire included Lebanon, which the agreement mentions three times in its opening paragraph. And it’s not just a commitment between the US and Iran, but also “their allies in the current war,” meaning Israel and the Axis of Resistance.
I have not sensed any shift in Tehran’s position on this issue, even though the regional situation has grown more complex, making such a ceasefire harder to ensure amid fighting between Ansarullah and Saudi Arabia.
Tehran Feels Stronger Internally
Trump’s February attack on Iran came less than two months after the largest and bloodiest protests against the Islamic Republic. By Tehran’s own admission, several thousand protesters were killed by security personnel, in addition to hundreds of police officers. The theocratic system’s internal security was at an all-time low.
Today, the government’s assessment of its internal strength and support has shifted 180 degrees. As one analyst in Iran told me: “The Iranian people and the Islamic Republic now share a destiny.”
That is, defeating one would mean defeating the other. Whether accurate or not, it reflects a strongly held perception by Iranian decision-makers that Trump and Israel’s bombs against civilian targets, threats against Iranian civilization, and insults to Iranian history have pushed the theocratic government and the people into the same boat. Increasingly, the war is seen as targeting Iran as a nation, not the current political system.
Consequently, Tehran appears far less concerned about Israel or the US’s ability to foment unrest inside of Iran as part of war or as a prelude to an attack.
Time is on Iran’s Side
Much like the collapse of the MOU, Tehran and Washington assess the benefit of time very differently. The White House insists that its blockade of the Persian Gulf, combined with higher volumes transiting the Strait, means Tehran has lost the battle of the Strait and that, over time, its economic and strategic situation will deteriorate dramatically.
Tehran sees it the other way around. Observers in Iran insist Tehran is collecting fees from ships transiting the Strait, is selling between 500,000 and 1,000,000 barrels of oil a day, and that Trump’s air blockade is already starting to fall apart. Moreover, regional dynamics also benefit Iran, Tehran believes, with Ansarullah’s successes in Yemen and against Saudi Arabia.
Over time, Tehran believes the US negotiating position will only weaken. As a result, the Iranians are not worried about any delaying tactics by the US side.
The Iranian Public has Shifted on Nukes
Contrary to the public narrative in the US, neither the Iranian public nor Iranian decision-makers have favored a nuclear weapon. DNI Tulsi Gabbard testified in 2025 that the US intelligence community assesses Iran is not building a nuclear weapon. Polls consistently showed that the Iranian public strongly favored retaining enrichment capabilities, but did not favor weaponization.
But much indicates that opinion in Iran – both at the public and elite levels – has shifted in favor of building the bombs. Though the trend began even before the June 2025 war, Israel and the US’s repeated attacks on Iran have predictably pushed opinion in favor of weaponization.
As a result, the political cost of major nuclear concessions is likely much higher today, making proposals that once were on the table, such as the February 2026 proposal mediated by the Omanis that would have entailed a de facto years-long Iranian moratorium on enrichment, significantly less likely to be accepted.
The Lure of Sanctions Relief is Waning
Iran’s economy needs sanctions relief. But is it worth giving concessions to secure such relief if it is deemed unreliable and too easily reversible?
As part of the MOU, Trump famously issued a blanket waiver that allowed Iranian oil sales. This was the first time the US had issued such a broad waiver. It signaled Trump’s willingness to offer far more sanctions relief than his predecessors. But just 16 days later, as the MOU began to fall apart, Trump withdrew the waiver and swiftly reimposed the oil sanctions.
The dramatic turn of events over 16 days reinforced Tehran’s view that US sanctions relief is fleeting, fickle, and unreliable. Whatever the US gives, it can take back on a turn of a dime.
As a result, offering irreversible nuclear concessions – such as Iran’s stockpile of 60% – in return for sanctions relief that is inherently and effortlessly reversible is national security malpractice.
Conclusion: A Deal is Not in the Making
All of these changes render a comprehensive deal less likely unless circumstances change considerably. Instead, I suspect Iran mainly seeks temporary deals to lower the temperature in the immediate term, without ever seriously addressing the core nuclear issue until Trump leaves office.
The Iranian calculation appears to be that the next American President will be loath to repeat Trump’s mistake of fighting a war with Iran and, as a result, will seek a deal with Tehran to alleviate the economic pain the conflict has inflicted on the American economy.
However, there are reasons to be skeptical of this Iranian strategy. Many of its assumptions are excessively charitable. For instance, while the Ansarullah offensive has arguably strengthened Iran’s position, it also risks birthing an anti-Iran coalition to balance against Iran’s new-won gains. Saudi Arabia has succeeded in drawing several countries – Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan – to its side against Ansarullah, rendering a proxy war between them and Iran plausible.
Moreover, past patterns suggest that a new American president will be loath to begin his or her term by striking a deal with Tehran that will largely be seen as favoring Iran. Instead of inheriting the cost of Trump’s foolish war, the next American president is more likely to kick the can down the road and hope that his or her successor will bite the bullet and sign a deal with Tehran.
As long as the political cost of striking a deal is higher than the cost of sustaining a low-intensity conflict with Iran, the obvious political choice of the next American president will be to keep the war and avert a deal. This is how America’s wars become endless.
Don’t Let the War Machine Do Your Thinking.
Washington sells war. Too much of the media repeats the sales pitch. Trita Parsi examines the interests, calculations and power struggles behind it. Drawing on 25 years of engagement with policymakers, the Quincy Institute co-founder delivers sharp analysis of Iran, Israel, Palestine and U.S. foreign policy—challenging official narratives and making the case for diplomacy over endless war.
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