Israel’s Political Deadlock: An Opportunity to Restrain Executive Power?

November 20, 2026

Hilal Cibik Informed Comment

 On 17 November, three weeks after Israel’s parliamentary elections, the newly elected Knesset replaced its speaker with Matan Kahana, a member of Gadi Eisenkot’s party. The following day, parliament gave preliminary approval to legislation seeking to reverse key elements of outgoing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s controversial judicial reforms.

What makes these developments particularly interesting from a constitutional perspective is that they have taken place before the formation of a new government. Netanyahu’s opponents have succeeded in asserting control over the legislature, while Netanyahu himself remains in office and continues to exercise executive power.

Could the temporary separation of these two political forces offer an opportunity to reconsider the constitutional relationship between parliament and government in Israel?

The Constitutional Limits of a Caretaker Government

Under Section 30(b) of Israel’s Basic Law: The Government, the outgoing government continues to perform its functions until a new government is formed. The rationale behind this provision is understandable. The failure to establish a new government should not prevent the state from functioning.

However, the possession of executive powers and the lawful exercise of those powers are two different matters.

In Weiss v. Prime Minister (2001), the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, examined whether the government of Ehud Barak could continue conducting peace negotiations with the Palestinians following his resignation.

Although the Court recognised that an outgoing government retained its executive powers, it also established that the transitional nature of the government affected the scope of its lawful discretion. The government was required to balance the need to act in the public interest against its duty to exercise restraint.

This principle was further developed in Landstein v. Spiegler (2005), where the Court considered the implications of a caretaker government’s diminished democratic legitimacy for the exercise of governmental powers.

The more pressing the public need for a particular decision, the less restraint may reasonably be expected of the government. Conversely, where no such urgency exists, the outgoing administration should generally refrain from taking decisions that could be left to its successor.

The difficulty, however, lies in determining what constitutes a sufficiently urgent public need, particularly in matters of national security and foreign affairs.

How Far Does the Duty of Restraint Extend?

Developments concerning the controversial E1 settlement project in the occupied West Bank provide a particularly interesting example.

On 22 October, five days before the parliamentary elections, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected petitions challenging the attorney general’s decision to postpone significant stages of the E1 tender process until after the elections.

In his judgment, Justice Ofer Grosskopf identified three principal reasons for restricting the exercise of executive power during transitional periods: preventing governmental powers from being used to secure electoral advantages, preserving the incoming government’s freedom to determine its own policies, and addressing the democratic deficit associated with a caretaker administration.

On 17 November, Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara instructed the outgoing government to suspend the tender process until a new government was formed.

Neither the Court’s decision nor the subsequent instruction resolved the question of the legality of the settlement project under international law. Their immediate concern was whether an outgoing government should proceed with a politically consequential decision at that particular time.

Compare this with Defence Minister Israel Katz’s statement on 12 November that the outgoing government did not require approval from the opposition or legal authorities to undertake military operations, including targeted killings in Gaza.

There is some legal basis for his position insofar as the consent of the opposition is concerned.

Section 40 of Basic Law: The Government assigns decisions concerning war and certain significant military operations to the government or its duly authorised ministerial committee. It does not establish a general requirement for prior parliamentary approval.

But the absence of such a requirement does not exempt the government from constitutional and administrative law constraints.

Israeli courts have traditionally afforded governments considerable discretion in matters of national security, including during transitional periods. In Kohelet Forum v. Prime Minister (2022), for instance, the Supreme Court permitted the outgoing government to conclude a maritime boundary agreement with Lebanon shortly before the elections.

What is particularly important about this judgment is that the Court did not regard the benefits of the agreement as sufficient justification in themselves. It also considered whether there was an urgent need to conclude the agreement before the elections, relying substantially on assessments provided by the security establishment.

A similar distinction deserves greater attention in the context of military operations. Whether an operation serves a legitimate security objective is one question; whether it must be undertaken at that particular time is another.

On 18 November, Israeli forces launched a ground operation in central Gaza, displacing Palestinian civilians once again despite the ceasefire agreed in October 2025.

If the possibility of restricting the policy choices of a future government justifies postponing a construction tender, should the potentially irreversible consequences of military decisions not warrant particularly careful scrutiny?

This does not mean that military operations and administrative decisions should be subject to identical legal requirements, nor that a caretaker government should be prevented from responding to genuine security threats. But the invocation of national security should not, in itself, be sufficient to establish the necessity of immediate action.

Can Parliament Exercise Greater Control?

In parliamentary systems, the government’s control over a parliamentary majority often considerably reduces parliament’s effectiveness in scrutinising executive action.

The present political circumstances in Israel are somewhat different. Netanyahu no longer commands a parliamentary majority, and the parties opposing him have already demonstrated their ability to exercise legislative power despite their inability to form a government.

There is a significant constitutional precedent for this.

In the Edelstein case of March 2020, the Supreme Court ruled that the incumbent speaker of the Knesset could not obstruct the parliamentary majority’s attempt to elect a new speaker on the grounds that doing so might interfere with negotiations over government formation.

The constitutional authority of parliament does not depend on the successful formation of a government.

Indeed, the Knesset already possesses several mechanisms through which it can scrutinise executive action.

Section 40(c) of Basic Law: The Government imposes notification requirements concerning military decisions. Section 42 empowers the Knesset and its committees to request information from the government and require ministers to appear before them. Furthermore, at least 40 members of parliament may request a parliamentary debate requiring the participation of the prime minister.

The provisional Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, whose chairman was elected on 16 November, could play a particularly important role during the current transitional period.

The committee should seek explanations concerning the urgency of significant military operations, the alternatives considered by the government and the foreseeable humanitarian consequences of its decisions.

Parliament could also consider introducing more specific statutory safeguards for caretaker governments. These might include a requirement to provide written reasons for major decisions that cannot reasonably be postponed, enhanced reporting obligations and prompt retrospective scrutiny where emergencies preclude prior examination.

Such measures would not transfer operational military authority to parliament. They would, however, make it more difficult for an outgoing government to invoke urgency and national security without adequately explaining its decisions.

Whether Netanyahu’s opponents are willing to scrutinise his military policies as closely as they scrutinise his judicial reforms is, of course, another question.

Beyond the Reversal of Netanyahu’s Constitutional Reforms

One of the bills given preliminary approval on 18 November seeks to repeal legislation that would substantially weaken the authority of Israel’s attorney general. The legislation, adopted in July 2026, is due to enter into force on 1 January 2027.


File photo of Benjamin Netanyahu and JD Vance, 2025. Office of the White House. Public Domain. Via Picryl

There is considerable irony here. The very institution whose authority Netanyahu’s government sought to diminish has now intervened to restrict that government’s exercise of executive power during the transitional period.

Reversing legislation that weakens judicial independence and legal oversight is undoubtedly important. But should the constitutional ambitions of Israel’s next government be limited to restoring the arrangements that existed before Netanyahu’s reforms?

The current political crisis offers an opportunity to address problems that predate those reforms, particularly the concentration of power in the executive and the difficulties associated with scrutinising governmental decisions in the name of national security.

For Palestinians living under occupation, who cannot hold the Israeli government accountable through national elections, the limitations of these mechanisms have consequences far beyond Israel’s domestic constitutional arrangements. Strengthening domestic oversight would not resolve the occupation or substitute for Israel’s obligations under international law, but it could provide additional means of challenging the exercise of governmental power that directly affects Palestinian lives.

The real constitutional achievement would therefore not simply be the removal of Netanyahu or the reversal of his judicial reforms. It would be the establishment of more effective restrictions on executive power that Netanyahu’s successors would themselves be required to observe.

Juan Cole’s Informed Comment delivers independent, expert analysis of war, the Middle East, climate change, and U.S. foreign policy. Help sustain this work

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