Yakov M. Rabkin Informed Comment
Two current foci of violence, West Asia and Eastern Europe, are fuelled by ethnic nationalism—fuelled rather than caused. The root causes of this violence lie elsewhere: among them, settler colonialism in Palestine, the geopolitical desire to weaken Russia, U.S. and Israeli exceptionalism, and the growing impact of the military-industrial-digital complex. But it is ethnic nationalism of the East European kind that sustains and exacerbates the wars in these two regions.
The origins of exclusionary ethnic nationalism are inseparable from the logic of state-building itself. Anthony Marx’s Faith in Nation challenges the comforting view that nationalism began as a civic, inclusive project. He argues that European nationalism emerged in the early modern era as a form of mass political engagement deliberately built on religious conflict, intolerance, and exclusion. State-builders needed to transfer power from local to central rulers, and the most effective vehicle for forging solidarity was the exclusion of internal minorities—the expulsion of Moors and Jews from Spain, the repression of Huguenots in France. Exclusion was not a deviation from nation-building; it was its glue.
In Eastern Europe, this logic arrived later but with peculiar intensity. John Connelly’s history of the region, From Peoples into Nations, identifies the core driver: the fear of “disappearing” as a nation. The opening line of the Polish national anthem, “Mazurek Dąbrowskiego,” is “Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła.” This translates literally as “Poland has not yet perished.” Written in 1797, a few years after the partition of Poland, it was meant to raise the morale of Polish troops who were then conquering Italy for Napoleon. The Ukrainian anthem similarly begins with “Shche ne vmerla Ukraina” (“Ukraine is not yet dead”), while Israel’s “Hatikvah” declares that the hope “to be a free nation in our own land” is not yet dead.
Zionist settlement and the state of Israel are ideological heirs of East European ethnic nationalism. Settlers from that region—particularly from what we now call Belarus, Poland, and Ukraine—shaped Israel’s political culture and nationalist ethos. They brought with them not only the violent experience of pogroms but also ideas of ethnic nationalism that had inspired intellectuals in Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and other areas inhabited by ethnic groups within multinational empires. An article I co-authored with Yaacov Yadgar in the journal Nationalities Papers outlines this phenomenon, and I am now completing a paper on the Russian revolutionary roots of Israeli militarism.
Intermingled through conquests and submerged within empires, competing nationalities experienced nationhood as precarious. The Habsburg monarch Joseph II’s decree imposing German as the language of his realm, intended to unify, instead catalysed competing nationalisms among Hungarians, Czechs, and others who feared cultural extinction. When survival is at stake, exclusion becomes existential rather than merely political. Policies of Russification under Alexander III and Nicholas II produced similar results.
The interwar period showed what happens when these nationalist dreams are incarnated in a nation-state. States were established in the context of the Treaty of Versailles, largely to form a “cordon sanitaire” against Soviet Russia. The new states acquired territories containing minorities more urban, educated, and “modern” than the titular nation. This was particularly true of Jewish minorities in Eastern Europe. Romania’s nation-building project after 1918 explicitly sought to replace existing elites with “pure” Romanian ones, embracing ethnic “purification” and making antisemitism central to nationalist ideology. This was exclusionary nationalism as state policy, not merely popular prejudice. The retreat from imperial multiethnic coexistence was engineered from above, and the fuel for later wars was refined in peacetime. These nationalists had agency and often used it brutally; they were not innocent victims, as one might infer from Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands.
Ethnic nationalism is not a relic of premodern tribalism but a distinctly modern political phenomenon that, when fused with territorial claims and victimhood narratives, becomes a reliable fuel for war. In his work Thought and Change, Ernest Gellner argued that “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (p. 169).
The history of Zionism is instructive here. As I have tried to show elsewhere, Israel’s founding ideology must be understood in the context of European ethnic nationalism, colonial expansion, and geopolitical interests, rather than as the fulfilment of biblical prophecy or the culmination of Jewish history. This is a crucial methodological point. Ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe was never merely a matter of identity; it was a program for territory, for demographic engineering, for the redrawing of borders along imagined lines of blood and soil.
Zionism had to contend with greater challenges than its East European forebears, who shaped nations from existing populations on their respective lands. The version of Zionism that ultimately prevailed in Palestine was, by necessity, more ambitious and had four essential goals:
- To transform the transnational, confessional Jewish identity centred on the Torah into a secular national identity similar to that of European nations.
- To equip the new nation with a new spoken language, based lexically on Biblical and rabbinical Hebrew and syntactically on Yiddish and Russian.
- To move Jews from their countries of origin to Palestine.
- To establish political and economic control over the new homeland.
The concept of “demodernization” sharpens the argument. Demodernization is a regression on the scale of modernity, a retreat from rational debate and multicultural coexistence toward tribalism, religious militancy, and ethnic exclusion. In this reading, the wars that convulse Eastern Europe and its periphery are not aberrations but symptoms. The dissolution of stable multiethnic societies—whether in the interwar period, the dismantlement of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union—creates a vacuum that ethnic entrepreneurs fill with narratives of ancient hatreds and existential threats.
In both Eastern Europe and Palestine, the renaming of streets, the removal of monuments, and the banning of languages are part and parcel of demodernization. Language also becomes a weapon. Well beyond West Asia and Eastern Europe, ritualized clichés are used to cast spells rather than to inform. According to Stephen Kinzer’s Boiling Point, in the first two months after February 24, 2022, the New York Times used the word “unprovoked” in its coverage of Ukraine 329 times—over five times a day. Slogans like “Stand with Ukraine,” “As long as it takes,” and “Israel’s right to exist” serve similar purposes: to muddle and shape public opinion.
What makes this fuel so combustible is its marriage to victimhood. In the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, one sees a shared collective ethos of victimhood and entitlement rooted in the horrors of the 20th century, wherein national identity is strengthened by the sense of an existential threat. An ethnic nationalism that defines itself primarily through past suffering and present peril cannot easily compromise, because compromise feels like annihilation. The neighbour becomes the perpetual aggressor; the border becomes a wound. This psychology is not unique to any one nation, but the conditions of Eastern Europe—where empires collapsed, borders shifted, and populations were exchanged or exterminated—have made it particularly fertile ground. When exported to West Asia, ethnic nationalism gave rise to incessant conflict in Palestine, Lebanon, and, to a certain degree, Turkey. It is also the feigned sense of potential victimhood that enables Israel and its allies to invoke Iran’s non-existent nuclear weapons program as an existential threat.

Generalfeldmarschall Paul von Hindenburg, Kaiser Wilhelm II. und General der Infanterie Erich Ludendorff am Kartentisch im Großen Hauptquartier, 1917. Quelle: BArch, Bild 183-R06898 / o.Ang.
One may be tempted to embrace the comforting illusion that ethnic nationalism is a problem of the “other,” of the backward East. But the same logic operates wherever ruling circles substitute moral superiority for rational analysis and dismiss dissent as propaganda. This is how—in countries hitherto known as liberal democracies—academic analysis is dismissed as “Kremlin talking points” or “support for Hamas,” and its authors are silenced, marginalized, hounded, sanctioned, detained, or exiled.
Ethnic nationalism fuels wars not because ancient hatreds are inevitable but because it offers simple answers to complex tragedies, and because those who wield it find that war is often the most effective way to consolidate the nation they claim to defend. History also shows that ethnic nationalism is fertile ground for waging wars against “internal enemies” and for the growth of fascism. In this sense, what goes on in Israel and Ukraine—where ethnic nationalism justifies violence and artificial intelligence directs it—may be a harbinger of a future awaiting all of us.
Juan Cole’s Informed Comment delivers independent, expert analysis of war, the Middle East, climate change, and U.S. foreign policy. Help sustain this work
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